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One of the most consequential outcomes of NBICS (nano-bio-info-cogno-synbio)
is the generation of products, processes and knowledge which
allow for "improvement" and modification of
the human body (structure, function, capabilities) beyond
its species-typical boundaries -- and in the end the modification,
generation and design of other species.
Many different enhancements exist with different
labels. Some of them are:
- Somatic genetic enhancement;
- Germline genetic enhancement;
- Enhancement for medical reasons/therapeutic
enhancement;
- Enhancement for social reasons/ non-therapeutic
enhancement;
- Positional enhancement;
- Intrinsically good enhancement;
- Body structure enhancement;
- Body function enhancement;
- Neuro structure and function enhancement;
- Ex ante enhancement; and
- Ex post enhancement.
An increasing number of people believe we
can, will and should try to overcome our biological limitations
by means of reason, science, and technology, and that the
move toward enhancement of the human body is not preventable.
(For a debate around the design of organisms see my column
Synthetic
Biology 2.0.)
So far, the debate around enhancements --
especially non-genetic enhancements and its many global
and local implications -- takes place mostly within academia,
and in some subgroups such as the transhumanists and disabled
people. It is not a debate that is entered into by the broader
public. That hopefully changes after the AAAS
Conference on Emerging Technologies for Enhancement,
which took place on June 1-2, 2006, in Washington, D.C.
Many arguments exist for and against enhancement
(see my recent publication).
In an article
about the AAAS Conference, the following arguments
in favor of enhancement can be identified.
(1) We have performed enhancement
as long as humans have existed.
"Since the advent of simple tools,
humans have been expanding their capacities. Cognitive enhancement
dates back to the written word, a primitive process for
downloading information from our minds to the hard drive
of parchment."
(2) Natural talent is
as unfair as the inequality of access to enhancement products.
"While no one may deserve their success
if they achieve it without effort, no one deserved their
natural talents either."
(3) Enhancement boosts the economy
and business competitiveness, and lowers the cost of doing
business.
"Yet developments in human enhancement
could also boost the economy and keep businesses competitive,
Lynch said, by preventing diseases that cost work hours
and healthcare expense and increasing employee learning
capacity and efficiency."
(4) We are already changing what
it means to be human.
"He noted a 2005 report recently cited
by British Prime Minister Tony Blair that linked chronic
violent video-game exposure to altered brain activity. This
fundamental cognitive shift, the report concluded, led to
desensitization and increased aggression."
(5) Enhancement is a private individual
choice. (I will discuss freedom of choice and morphological
freedom in a later column.)
"Should people's
vague anxieties about the way things are going keep me from
taking a drug that allows me to think better, that allows
me to live an extra 20 years of life?' Hughes asked. 'All
of those are very private decisions that don’t harm
other people.'"
(6) There is a blurry line between
therapy and enhancement.
"There is a blurry line between enhancement
and therapy, Hughes said. Is it enhancement to improve someone`s
body in a way that slows aging and inhibits certain diseases,
or is it preventative treatment for those ailments?"
(7) One can't deal with enhancement
in a blanket way, but has to do it on a case-by-case basis.
(In my view, this leads to no action because there are insufficient
financial and human resources available to deal with every
individual enhancement.)
"'One of the best ways to deal with
(human enhancement) is to promote as much transparency as
possible and open dialogue,' Amy Patterson, director of
the Office of Biotechnology Activity at the National Institutes
of Health, told UPI. She added that the issue is best considered
within the context of individual drugs, since the separate
effects of each warrant different actions."
The most visible argument against enhancement
in the limited public discourse is that one can and should
draw a line between therapeutic and enhancement interventions.
I believe that might not be as easy as it sounds, if not
imposssible, since many therapies have aspects of enhancement
and many enhancements can be classified as therapies.
A variation of the theme states that one
can and should draw a line between therapeutic and non-therapeutic
enhancements. I believe the line is impossible to draw,
as many therapeutic interventions can and are used later
for non-therapeutic purposes. There are many examples in
my publication.
Modafinil, sold in Canada as Alertec, was
developed for the treatment of narcolepsy. In September
2003, an advisory panel to the FDA endorsed its use for
treating shift-work sleep disorder and obstructive sleep
apnea. Modafinil is also attracting attention from
the military and from "healthy" people as a possible
alertness drug. There are about 150,000 Americans with
narcolepsy, but as many as 250,000 Americans are using modafinil. The
drug is increasingly used to alleviate sleepiness due to
many causes, including depression, jet lag, or working long
hours with too little sleep.
The line between therapeutic and non-therapeutic
enhancements is also very hard to draw because of the very
fluid view of the term "therapeutic" and the dynamic
of medicalization. However the link between the justification
and acceptability of enhancement and the concept of health,
therapy and the dynamic of medicalization is very rarely
discussed. I deal with this extensively
in my publication
in terms of the three steps described below.
Step 1: Change the meaning of the
term "health"...
Many people know about the medical and social
model of health. However, most people are unfamiliar with
the transhumanist model of health.
In the transhumanist enhancement model,
"health" no longer has the endpoint where someone
is healthy if biological systems function within species-typical,
normative frameworks. In this model, all Homo sapiens
-- no matter how conventionally "medically healthy"
-- are defined as limited, defective, and in need of constant
improvement made possible by new technologies. (A little
bit like the constant software upgrades we do on our computers.)
"Health" in this model means having obtained maximum
(at any given time) enhancement (improvement) of one's abilities,
functioning, and body structure. "Disease" is
identified in accordance with negative self-perceptions
of one's non-enhanced body.
Interventions on the level of the individual
that add new abilities or improve on the existing abilities
of Homo sapiens are seen as the remedy for ill
medical health. Enhancement medicine is the new field providing
the remedy through surgery, pharmaceuticals, implants and
other means. Notions of disease prevention, public health,
healthy community, health promotion, and the actions they
entail, all change substantially in the transhumanist enhancement
model.
Step 2: Make "healthy"
people feel bad about themselves...
More and more variations of human body structure
and functioning are labelled as diseases (dynamic of medicalization).
A growing number of medical technologies are employed to
improve the looks, performance, and psychological well-being
of people who are healthy. The traditional form of medicalization
artificially assigned a subnormal label to normal variations
in human characteristics.
Step 3: The transhumanization of
medicalization...
The transhumanist model of health and disease
defines the human body in general as defective, or as a
work in progress, elevating medicalization to its ultimate
endpoint; namely, to see enhancement beyond species-typical
body structures and functioning as a therapeutic intervention
(transhumanization of medicalization). This moves medicalization
to its logical conclusion by adding the enhancement of body
appearance and functioning above species-typical norms and
boundaries to the mix.
The Choice is Yours
Simple prohibition of enhancement -- drawing
a line in the sand between therapeutic (yes) and non-therapeutic
(no) -- will not work to govern the development and use
of enhancements as long as the dynamics of step 1-3 are
in place. These dynamics can't be eliminated by laws per
se, only by decrease in demand.
It is your choice to look beyond the obvious
easy-at-first-glance but untenable solution of line drawing,
to find a more tenable way to govern enhancement. Without
questioning "able-ism" one can not take on the
issue of enhancement. According to Fiona Campbell, able-ism
is a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produce
a particular kind of self and body -- the corporeal standard
-- that is projected as perfect, species-typical and therefore
essential and fully human. Disability/ impairment is then
a diminished state of being human. (Able-ism will be the
topic of a future column.)
If we do not question able-ism, we will
have a hard time questioning the tenets of transhumanism,
for in the end one is the extension of the other.
Gregor Wolbring is a biochemist, bioethicist, science and
technology ethicist, disability/vari-ability studies scholar,
and health policy and science and technology studies researcher
at the University of Calgary. He is a member of the Center
for Nanotechnology and Society at Arizona State University;
Member CAC/ISO - Canadian Advisory Committees for the International
Organization for Standardization section TC229 Nanotechnologies;
Member of the editorial team for the Nanotechnology
for Development portal of the Development Gateway Foundation;
Chair of the Bioethics Taskforce of Disabled
People's International; and Member of the Executive
of the Canadian Commission for UNESCO. He publishes the
Bioethics,
Culture and Disability website.
| A
longer publication on this issue... |
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| Other
links... |
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| See
also... |
- F. Baylis and J. S. Robert. "The
inevitability of genetic enhancement technologies."
Bioethics 18, 1 1-26, PM:15168695. 2004.
- Fiona A.K.Campbell. "Inciting
Legal Fictions: 'Disability's Date with Ontology
and the Ableist Body of the Law." Griffith
Law Review 10, 1-42. 2001.
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Please
contact the author for information on these references
or for additional future references at gwolbrin@ucalgary.ca |
©Gregor Wolbring, All Rights Reserved,
2006. Reprinted with permission.
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